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Abstract 
 
In the aftermath of the global financial recession the Basel-III international regulatory 
framework for international banks was written. Although it was set up to solve the deficiencies 
of its predecessor – Basel-II – and prevent another financial crisis from happening, some 
mistakes of Basel-II are to be repeated in the current implementation process of Basel-III. This 
thesis assesses the lessons that can be learnt from Basel-II and how these can be applied in the 
implementation of Basel-III. This process is analysed for the Euro-area. I conclude that Basel-
III has improved on the technical aspect compared to Basel-II; for example the risk assessment 
ratios have been improved and counter-cyclicality has been incorporated. However, regarding 
the implementation process of Basel-II, the same mistakes regarding implementation and 
communication between relevant EU institutions are to be made for Basel-III. Implementation 
is slow, EU dependency on the US is high and communication between EU institutions involved 
in the implementation process remains inefficient.  
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1. Introduction     
  The past decade has been extremely challenging for the international banking sector. 
More than any other sector, it has been in desperate need of well-functioning and well-
coordinated regulation. However, the banking regulation in place seemed not to suffice in order 
to prevent a global financial crisis from happening in 20071. It seemed as regulators were caught 
off-guard by the financial crisis, as they did not realise quick enough that regulation was 
defaulting2. It was only after the financial crisis that regulators all over the world realised the 
banking supervision was lacking efficiency and that deregulation was one of the reasons the 
financial crisis escalated. Banking regulation seemed to have missed the gravity of the excessive 
risk taking and the accumulation of vulnerabilities in the banking sector for decades3. How can 
this be prevented from happening again?  
   The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) was working on the revised 
international capital framework Basel-II, just before the financial crisis, which attempted to 
regulate the international banking system better. Yet, Basel-II turned out to have many 
macroeconomic aspects which may have worsened the crisis. Especially Basel-II’s pro-
cyclicality. This encouraged banks to continue taking excessive risk during the upward trend in 
2003/2004, because the pro-cyclical philosophy believed that following the economic trend 
would be best. This eventually resulted in banks being well over-leveraged, which resulted in 
the financial collapse being bigger than expected4. Additionally, the timing of Basel-II was poor, 
as the financial crisis was already on its way and implementation was very slow.  
  As the international economy is slowly recovering from the economic recession, Basel-
III is being implemented to prevent another financial crisis from happening. Because this is 
currently happening, it is important for international political economy to assess how we can 
learn from past deficiencies. What were the reasons that many Basel-II deficiencies were 
unforeseen? Was the implementation too slow, or was the design merely too simplistic?  
                                                          
1 Tarullo, D. (2008). Banking on Basel: the future of international financial regulation. Person institute for 
international economics. 1257.  
2 VoxEU. (2015). Post-Crisis Banking Regulation: Evolution of economic thinking as it happened on Vox.  
3 Ibid.  
4 Landeau, J.P. (2009). Procyclicality – what it means and what could be done. Paper presented  at Procyclicality 
and the Role of Financial Regulation, Madrid, Spain.  
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  Academic research has been conducted on how Basel-II might have amplified the 
financial crisis, but no research has been conducted on how we take lessons from Basel-II. It is 
one thing to distinguish what went wrong during Basel-II and the financial crisis, but it is 
another to take those lessons into account when implementing another regulatory accord. It is 
of utmost importance that lessons are taken from Basel-II and that future strategy takes these 
lessons into account, to prevent repetition of default. Lessons can be learned for the technical 
aspects, but also for the implementation of Basel-III. Especially in the Euro-area, there is room 
for improvement on the implementation of the accords. Numerous institutions play a role in the 
implementation, which need better coordination.  
  This bachelor project therefore aims to indicate what lessons have been learned from 
the implementation of Basel-II within the Euro-area and aims to then give advice on how to 
correctly structure the implementation of Basel-III. It is of upmost importance to ask this 
question, in order to avoid repeating the same mistakes from Basel-II. The financial crisis has 
been one of the events with the largest global impact in the past decade and it is therefore 
important to prevent a similar crisis from happening. As inefficient regulation was one of the 
largest provokers of the financial crisis, analysation of current efficient regulation is extremely 
useful. Especially in the Euro-area, with many different institutions and a lack of cohesiveness, 
efficient implementation of Basel-III must be aimed for. The research question for this bachelor 
thesis will therefore be:  
What lessons have been learned from Basel-II; the ECB’s implementation of Basel-III in the 
Euro-area. 
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2. Research context 
Far-reaching financialisation of the western world, combined with deregulation and inefficient 
banking supervision5, were notorious features of the financial crisis. Excessive risk taking was 
encouraged, especially through complex financial instruments. But the financial regulation 
lacked quick response to the changes, resulting in excessive under-regulation of the banking-
world6. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, much research has been conducted on the 
technical deficiencies of financial regulation. However, the international political economy 
research is missing an assessment of how we can take lessons from past mistakes and use them 
in the current implementation of Basel-III.   
  In most political economic research, only the macroeconomic effects of the Basel-III 
regulation are being analysed and lessons which have been learned from the economic crisis 
are omitted. Mostly, literature is focused on the proposed regulation and how it may directly 
influence the international economy. However, when assessing the Basel accords, policy 
implementation and non-macroeconomic variables must also be considered. Articles such as 
‘Jeffrey Atik: Basel-II: a post-crisis post-mortem’7 are successful in finding the problems 
within Basel-II, but fail to look at what can be learned. To assure that the same mistakes from 
Basel-II will not be repeated, this bachelor project will analyse what lessons have been learned 
from Basel-II in the implementation of Basel-III, making it a very valuable contribution to 
international relations.  
  In most analyses of Basel-II and –III, the process of implementation within the member 
states is largely ignored. Nevertheless, the implementation of the accords form an important 
feature in the success of both accords. This bachelor project will therefore also focus on the 
implementation process of Basel-III in the Euro-area and how this possibly can be improved 
upon in comparison to Basel-II.   
  The implementation of Basel-III in the Euro-area especially forms an interesting area of 
research, because of the ECB’s supranational status within a community of sovereign states8. 
The ECB has an enormous range of influence, conducting monetary policy for 12 autonomous 
                                                          
5 Sikka, P. (2009). Financial crisis and the silence of the auditors. Accounting, organizations and society, 34(5), 
868-873 
6 Ibid.   
7 Atik, J. (2008). Basel II: a post-crisis post mortem. Transnational law & contemporary problems, 19 (731), 
731-759. 
8 ECB. (2006). The European Central Bank: history, role and functions. 41-45.  
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states and is therefore very different from other large central banks 9 . Researching the 
implementation process of a large international player such as the ECB will add significantly 
to the academic understanding of the European role in international political economy.   
  Additionally, it is important to realise that the ECB is an international political actor and 
is influenced by other BCBS Member States10. The United States (US) is one of the most 
notable factors of influence. Even during the global financial crisis, the ECB’s decisions were 
largely influenced by the decisions of the US11. Therefore, this bachelor thesis will consider the 
policy decisions of the US as a factor of influence on the EU’s policy decisions. This will 
provide more insight into the interplay between these economic world powers and why they 
both make certain decisions on the implementation of the Basel accords, thus forming an 
important academic contribution to international political economy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 ECB. (2006). The European Central Bank: history, role and functions. 42-46.  
10 Holmquist, J. (2007) Implementation of Basel II: challenges & opportunities. European Central Bank. 2-5.  
11 Ibid. p. 9-12.  
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 3. Research design 
The research of this bachelor thesis is conducted via qualitative literature research mainly. 
Using the available literature on the financial crisis and the aftermath of Basel-II, conclusions 
are drawn on the deficiencies and aftermath of Basel-II. This is done using some literature 
which reviews the financial crisis and its causes, but mainly primary sources are used, to get an 
accurate analysis of the accords and because the implementation of Basel-III is still underway.  
  Firstly, under conceptualisation and operationalisation the distinction is made between 
the explanation of the technical aspects of the accords and the implementation process of the 
accords. This distinction will also be made whilst looking at the lessons learnt. The 
conceptualisation will also encompass the deficiencies of Basel-II, to provide a clear overview 
of the history of Basel. During the analysis, the comparison between both accords is made and 
special attention is drawn to the current implementation process of Basel-III in the EU. This 
will add up to the final chapter discussing the lessons learnt form Basel-II in the implementation 
of Basel-III.   
  As primary literature, the Basel accords themselves are being used as well as reports 
from the ECB, BCBS, EP and independent researchers. As Basel-III is currently being 
implemented, primary sources show the most accurate and recent information on the accords.
   
  Additionally, an interview with a policy official of the EP is conducted to acquire insight 
on the EU’s internal workings and the policy process regarding the Basel accords. Official 
documents of the EU on the Basel accords, acquired from this interview, are used to analyse 
the official European stance on Basel.       
  From the literature, general deficiencies of Basel-II are deducted and tested for the 
implementation and design of Basel-III. This thesis tests whether the same deficiencies appear 
and if so, what can be done to repair these deficiencies in the implementation of Basel-III in the 
Euro-area and in the design of Basel-III in general. This thesis thus seeks for a repetition of 
default and aims to advice on how to prevent the same deficiencies from happening.   
   The Euro-area has been chosen as the case, because the EU has substantial 
influence in international relations and a large amount of variables partake in the decision-
making of the EU. Because there is a lot of literature available on the EU, such as EU reports 
and monitoring reports, the EU presents a good case to research whether lessons have been 
learnt. Additionally, there are numerous independent variables such as the financial crisis, the 
10 
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correspondence of EU institutions amongst each other and the EU dependence on the USA. 
 Using the lessons learnt from Basel-II for the implementation of Basel-III in the Euro-
area, an advice can be drawn up for how to avoid repetition of the same mistakes in the 
implementation of Basel-III. The advice is a theoretical advice on the areas that need special 
attention during the implementation of Basel-III in the Euro area. The critique will be aimed at 
the institutional framework of the EU representation within the BCBS, parts of the design of 
Basel-III and the implementation of Basel-III.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
Leiden university | International Relations and Organisations | Bachelor Thesis | Cassie Tingen | 
4. Conceptualisation and operationalisation 
4.1 TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF BASEL-II  
4.1.1 Basel-II and the financial crisis  
Firstly, to understand the history of the Basel accords, this chapter will explain the role of Basel 
in the financial crisis. The European Commission (EC) pointed out in 2007 that the international 
banking sector had become too complex for existing regulation to persist12. Even though policy 
makers were clearly aware of the pressing situation, the implementation process of Basel-II was 
slow and international banking regulation was very poor. Basel-II had been agreed upon but 
was not yet implemented when the crisis hit, meaning banks were still able to take an excessive 
amount of risk in 2007 and 200813.   
  Banks and investment institutes were allowed to invest in high risk assets, which led to 
strong credit growth. The most notable effect was an enormous asset price bubble14 in the 
American housing market15. The result was soaring housing-prices in the sub-prime mortgage 
sector, causing many mortgages to fail and the market to collapse. The International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) verified that the market collapse was caused by the credit boom and the weakness 
of the risk regulation16 and that there was a complete weakness in regulation of the mortgage 
market. This resulted in the general undercapitalization of financial institutions, meaning that 
financial institutions had little to no buffer to protect them in times of financial distress17.  
  At the beginning of the financial crisis, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) decided that 
Basel-II should have priority in international banking regulation. Basel-II followed a pro-
cyclical regulatory approach18, which is a governmental approach which magnifies economic 
                                                          
12 Holmquist, J. (2007) Implementation of Basel II: challenges & opportunities. European Central Bank. 2-3.  
13 Lombardy, D. & Zelebena, J. (2013). Basel II: what went wrong. Center for International Government 
Innovation. 2013(5). 18-25.  
14 Asset price bubble: occurs when the price of an asset rises rapidly without underlying fundamentals to justify 
the rising price, such as a rapid rise in the demand of the product. When the price starts to rise, investors jump in 
on the rising price, making the prices rise even more and the asset bubble to feed on itself.  
15 Lombardy, D. & Zelebena, J. (2013). Basel II: what went wrong. Center for International Government 
Innovation. 2013(5). 18-25. 
16 Ibid.  
17 Ibid.    
18 Lombardy, D. & Zelebena, J. (2013). Center for International Government Innovation: During a period of 
crisis, banks will be faced with two choices: either recapitalize or reduce assets. Banks are reluctant to raise 
capital during a period of financial distress and so often their only real alternative is to reduce assets. This leads 
to credit-crunch conditions and fire sales – in short, pro-cyclicality –with a high social cost to the financial 
system and economy. Capital requirements for banks are governed by the standards set out by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). 
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fluctuations. This meant that banks’ capital adequacy19 requirements were low and they were 
allowed to be very high-leveraged. The BCBS did not prioritize the quality of capital assets for 
banks; and financial institutions could use their own internal risk assessment measurements to 
decide whether they met the capital requirements. This resulted in the first problem: firms 
became over-leveraged, holding non - High Quality Liquid Assets (non-HQLA) as their capital 
leverage. The second problem was that many banks found ways of shadow banking20, to move 
certain high-risk investments off their books to circumvent the requirements of the BCBS21. 
  Thus, looking back at Basel-II and the financial crisis, big problems were deregulation, 
a lack of risk management and a lack of quick regulatory response and oversight when the crisis 
hit.  
4.1.2 Basel-II regulatory framework  
To understand what technical lessons can be learnt from Basel-II, this chapter will explain the 
Basel-II regulatory framework.   
  Basel-II was published early on in 2004. The main purpose of Basel-II was to create a 
better way of calculating how much risk a bank is facing and how much capital banks needed 
to hold in reserve to cover that risk22. In doing so, Basel-II set up risk capital requirements 
incorporating three main goals 23 . Firstly, banks’ capital should be more sensitive to risk. 
Secondly, risk management tactics in larger banks should be improved and strengthened. 
Thirdly, economic and regulatory capital should be better aligned throughout BCBS member 
states, to assure that regulatory arbitrage24 cannot happen.  
  The structure was based on the following pillars 25:  
I. Minimum capital requirements: Improvements on the calculation of the risk-weighted 
assets of a bank. Operational risk was added as a risk assessment tool, which calculates 
the risk of losses as a result of human and internal flaws. A more controversial addition 
                                                          
19 Definition of capital adequacy can be found in chapter 4.1.4 
20 Lombardy, D. & Zelebena, J. (2013). Center for International Government Innovation: the shadow banking 
system, according to the FSB, “can be broadly described as credit intermediation involving entities and activities 
outside the regular banking system.” This includes instruments such as repurchase (“repo”)markets for short-
term financing of securities, asset-backed commercial or other paper, money market funds, structured investment 
vehicles and other finance companies like special-purpose vehicles.  
21 Lombardy, D. & Zelebena, J. (2013). Basel II: what went wrong. Center for International Government 
Innovation. 2013(5). 18-25. 
22 ECB (2005). The new Basel capital accord: main features and implications 
23 Ibid.   
24 The system in which companies can capitalize on loopholes in the international regulatory systems. In that 
way, they circumvent regulation which is not favorable for them.  
25 ECB. (2005). The new Basel capital accord: main features and implications. Retrieved from  
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb_mb0105_basel_2en.pdf 
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was the Internal Ratings-Based approach (IRB), which allowed certain banks to 
estimate their own parameters for calculating how much capital they need to hold in 
stock26. Banks had to meet certain integrity and rating requirements to qualify for IRB. 
II. The supervisory review process: Supervisory institutions would only assess whether a 
bank’s capital was consistent with its risk profile, but banks assessed their own capital 
adequacy. Pillar II assessed whether banks complied with the capital requirements in 
Pillar I.  
III. Market discipline: banks published reports on their risks, capital and risk management. 
Particularly, publishing the measurement techniques for assessing its own risk27.  
4.1.3 Basel-II in the EU    
To analyse what lessons the EU can learn from Basel-II, it is important to assess the 
implementation process of Basel-II in the Euro-area.  
  Basel-II had to be implemented in such a way to match the Single Market28 context29. 
The implementation process of Basel-II was carried out and monitored by the ECB. The ECB 
planned to implement Basel-II for internationally active banks and domestically active banks. 
The ECB also planned to have a high degree of consistency of implementation. External 
credit assessment institutions (ECAIs) supervised this30.   
  Concerns were raised within the ECB that the new capital rules would have a negative 
impact on private equity and the venture capital industry31. EU banks were one of the major 
economic powers in the Euro-area and the new Basel-II capital requirements would prevent 
banks making the profitable and risky investments that they were able to make before Basel-
II. Therefore, the CRD IV32 proposed to take the degree of diversification of a bank’s assets 
into consideration when deciding on capital requirements.   
  A second concern was that small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) would be 
negatively affected by Basel-II’s quantitative rating methods for capital requirements, as 
                                                          
26 Pluto, K. and Tasche, D. (2010). Internal-Ratings-Based Approach. Encyclopedia of Quantitative Finance. 
27ECB. (2005). The new Basel capital accord: main features and implications. Retrieved from  
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb_mb0105_basel_2en.pdf  
28 Single Market in the EU: an economic plan by the EU to view the EU’s territory as a single state market, 
without internal borders or obstacles for free movement of services and goods. The idea is to stimulate economic 
competition, trade, efficiencies and lower prices. The Basel accords therefore need to be aware that there are no 
border restrictions between EU banks.  
29 ECB (2005). The new Basel capital framework and its implementation in the European Union. Occasional 
Paper series no. 42. 20-23.  
30 Ibid. p. 18. 
31 Ibid. p. 20-23.  
32 Explanation of the CRD IV can be found in chapter 4.1.5.  
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opposed to the qualitative rating measures they were used to33. The ECB therefore proposed 
several adjustments to the BCBS, which the BCBS eventually accepted.   
  The pro-cyclicality of Basel-II was another matter of concern. In the banking sector, 
pro-cyclicality results in banks’ loans following the same economic cycle as the real 
economy; thus less loans will be carried out in a period of economic slowdown. The ECB was 
worried that in a period of economic downturn this would mean that the pro-cyclical 
regulation of Basel-II would worsen economic slowdown34. This would then cause higher risk 
sensitivity, resulting in rising capital requirements and reduced lending35. The IRB would also 
worsen economic crisis as follows: in a period of economic downturn, the new credit 
measurements may oblige banks to have more capital in their reserves. If banks cannot easily 
adjust the required capital level, they will have to reduce lending. This will result in 
consumers being able to borrow less and consume less, aggravating economic recession36.  
  Thus, the EU had already voiced their concerns about certain aspects of Basel-II 
beforehand, but these were not incorporated in any revisions of Basel-II.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
33 ECB (2005). The new Basel capital framework and its implementation in the European Union. Occasional 
Paper series no. 42. 9-11. 
34 Ibid. p. 29-31.  
35 ECB. (2005). The new Basel capital accord: main features and implications. Retrieved from  
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb_mb0105_basel_2en.pdf 
36 Ibid. p. 56-57.  
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4.1.4 CAPITAL ADEQUACY  
In both Basel accords, capital adequacy has a leading role in creating stability. It is therefore 
necessary to assess what capital adequacy entails. 
  Capital adequacy represents the extent to which a bank is able to cover its liabilities 
using its assets37. If the assets exceed the liabilities, a bank will be better able to withstand 
periods of economic distress, because a bank has more money in ownership than it is 
spending38. With high rates of capital adequacy, a period of economic distress is less likely to 
happen.   
  The loans banks hold on their asset side are not always very liquid. This will cause a 
problem during economic distress39. On the liabilities side, banks are dependent on a very 
large amount of high liquid debts; deposits by costumers. They, however, have the right to 
withdraw their deposits without notice. If the withdrawals accumulate and a bank run 
happens, banks will not have enough cash at hand to continue normal payments and a bank 
failure is close40. Capital adequacy requirements create a buffer if a bank runs out of their 
assets.   
 
4.1.5 Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) VI   
The EC has set up a revised policy proposal in 2016, which will ‘download’ certain aspects of 
global financial regulation into EU regulation. This package encompasses global regulatory 
accords, with Basel-III as the main priority41.  
  CRD-IV is the European regulatory banking strategy for the coming two to three years. 
It enacts the LCR, the NSFR and the LR42. The EU’s legislative process may take a few years. 
Thus, implementation of these rules may miss deadlines set up by the BCBS.   
  Although the ratios are incorporated into the CRD-IV, the EU has shown willingness 
to diverge from the BCBS accords. For example, the EC is granted the privilege to extend the 
phasing-in of the market risk framework at any time. This means that the EU will not keep to 
                                                          
37 Posner, E, A. (2015). How Do Bank Regulators Determine Capital Adequacy Requirements? The University 
of Chicago Law Review. (82)1853. 1857-1858.  
38 Ibid.  p. 1858.  
39 Ibid.  p. 1858-1859.  
40 Ibid.  p. 1858-1859.  
41 Strachan, D. & Martin, S. (2016). CDR V/CRR II | To 2020 – and beyond? [Press release]. Retrieved from 
http://blogs.deloitte.co.uk/financialservices/2016/11/crd-vcrr-ii-to-2020-and- beyond.html 
42 Ibid.  
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the BCBS implementation date43 . Another example is that the EC decided that interbank 
funding and derivative transactions will not be included in the calculation of the NSFR44. 
 The CDR-IV counts as EU regulation, but internationally active banks are subject to 
more jurisdictions than only the EU’s45. Because the CDR IV differs from the normal BCBS 
accords, internationally active banks face pressure from two different jurisdictions. This can 
cause problems during implementation.        
4.2 BASEL-II AFTERMATH AND DEFICIENCIES  
 Now that the technical aspect of Basel-II have been discussed, this chapter will analyse the 
deficiencies which came to light in the aftermath.   
  Basel-II was barely implemented when the international economy fell into recession. 
The BCBS did not know that the financial recession would change the international economy 
so much that some aspects of Basel-II would negatively affect the economy. The deficiencies 
can be categorised as deficiencies in the design of Basel-II, and in the implementation of Basel-
II.   
  The first implementation deficiency was the fact that Basel-II did not have the judicial 
strength and international dominance to carry out the intended regulation. Basel-II is not a treaty 
and therefore did not have the jurisdiction of a treaty that would make compliance with Basel-
II mandatory46. Basel-II is soft law, imposing no legal obligations and no legal requirement for 
consistent implementation. This resulted in inconsistent implementation.   
 The second implementation deficiency was that Basel-II was to underpin regulatory 
arbitrage, but without consistent implementation, this failed47. Another factor is that banks 
operate on an international level and cash flows run from one jurisdiction to another 24/7. If 
there is inconsistency in implementation of Basel-II capital regulation, banks will find ways to 
circumvent Basel-II’s capital requirements. This will drive financial activity into the member 
state with the least compliance to Basel-II and the lowest capital requirements, as this is the 
most profitable for banks48.    
  Thirdly, the implementation process of Basel-II raised concerns about institutional 
                                                          
43 Strachan, D. & Martin, S. (2016). CDR V/CRR II | To 2020 – and beyond? [Press release]. Retrieved from 
http://blogs.deloitte.co.uk/financialservices/2016/11/crd-vcrr-ii-to-2020-and- beyond.html 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid.  
46 Atik, J. (2008). Basel II: a post-crisis post mortem. Transnational law & contemporary problems, 19 (731), 
737-740.  
47 Ibid. p. 743-744.  
48 Ibid. p. 743-744.  
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competitiveness and regulatory competition among member states49. As some member states 
may choose to implement the Basel-II regulation at a later stage or in a less invasive manner, 
creating a comparative advantage for banks located in that jurisdiction. Basel-II provides a 
platform for this; not only because Basel-II is a soft law, but also because the IRB allowed 
capital requirements to differ largely between jurisdictions. To establish a level playing field, 
equivalent capital standards must be implemented consistently50.   
 The fourth implementation deficiency was that during the implementation phase of 
Basel-II, it was almost seen as an all-inclusive banking regulation package. The FSB prioritized 
Basel-II and there was a newfound enthusiasm in it51. The deficiencies and lack of flexibility 
were, however, overlooked. As the financial crisis had just started, Basel-II had many countries 
depending on it to boost their economy. There was possibly a false sense of security52. A 
design deficiency was that Basel-II relied heavily on credit rating agencies. But most credit 
rating agencies failed to assess how much risk most new financial assets, such as sub-prime 
mortgages, were causing53. Credit rating agencies were hired by the very same banks they 
should have been rating, making them far from independent. Basel-II explicitly incorporated 
the credit rating from these agencies in its own capital adequacy assessment, making the corrupt 
rating agencies an important player in the financial crisis.   
  A second design deficiency was the pro-cyclicality of Basel-II. This meant that capital 
requirements would increase when the economy falls into recession and decrease during an 
expansion54. Therefore, banks react to recessions by cutting on lending during a recession and 
expanding on lending during expansions. Causing expansions and recessions to be amplified. 
This happened during the 2007 recession, although the ECB repeatedly warned for this.  
 Thus, Basel-II lacked international judicial strength, failed to underpin regulatory 
arbitrage because of inconsistent implementation and increased competitiveness among 
member states. Furthermore, the reliance on credit rating agencies was faulty and pro-
cyclicality ameliorated the economic crisis.  
                                                          
49 Atik, J. (2008). Basel II: a post-crisis post mortem. Transnational law & contemporary problems, 19 (731), 
743-745.  
50 Ibid. p. 743-745.    
51 Lombardy, D. & Zelebena, J. (2013). Basel II: what went wrong. Center for International Government 
Innovation. 2013(5). 18-25. 
52 Atik, J. (2008). Basel II: a post-crisis post mortem. Transnational law & contemporary problems, 19 (731), 
748-750. 
53 Ibid. p. 748-750.  
54 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004). Procyclicality in Basel II: Can We Treat the Disease  
Without Killing the Patient? Retrieved from https://www.bis.org/bcbs/events/rtf04gordy_howells.pdf 
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4.3 IMPLEMENTATION OF BASEL-III  
4.3.1. Basel-III implementation phase 
The source beneath is retrieved from the Bank of International Settlements and is an overview 
of the proposed implementation deadlines for all BCBS members. Nevertheless, progress 
reports have shown that almost no member states have succeeded in following this 
implementation strategy yet55.    
 The BCBS pointed out in 2012 that for Basel-III “consistent implementation will be 
fundamental to raising the resilience of the global banking system, in maintaining market 
confidence in regulatory ratios and in providing a level-playing field”56. This is needed to 
prevent another financial crisis from happening57.   
 The BCBS has set up a phase-in period of five years, starting in 2013 and being 
                                                          
55 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision reforms - Basel III. (2013, January). Retrieved from Bank of 
International Settlements: http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3/b3summarytable.pdf 
56 Borak, D. (2013). Basel III accord at risk of implementation deficiencies. American Banker.  
57  Bank of International Settlements. Basel III: international regulatory framework for banks. Retrieved from: 
Retrieved from https://www.bis.org/bcbs/events/rtf04gordy_howells.pdf 
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completely finalized in 2019. The Regulatory Consistency Assessment Program (RCAP) of the 
BCBS monitors the implementation on timeliness, consistency and outcomes58.  
4.3.2 Basel-III implementation in the EU 
To research whether the EU has learnt lessons for the implementation of Basel-III, the 
implementation status within the EU needs to be assessed. Ordered by the ECB, research is 
carried out on EU banks’ compliance with Basel-III implementation. They have concluded:  
 LCR in the Euro-area: Compliance to the implementation process is high, with banks 
adapting the LCR before the deadlines59.  
 NSFR in the Euro-area: based on the EBA reports, EU banks were compliant with the 
NSFR regulation in 2015, three years before the implementation deadline60.  
 LR in the Euro-area: LR has been incorporated in the CRD IV. Nonetheless, the 
majority of the banks do fall above the prescribed 3% LR in 2014, meaning 
implementation has not been completed61.  
The BCBS progress report 2016 stated that the EU has not yet complied with all regulatory 
demands. The margin requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives should have been 
implemented, but is lacking in EU regulation62. Additionally, the LCR disclosure requirements 
have not been set in motion by the EU, whilst the deadline passed in 201563 . Slow and 
inconsistent implementation seems to be repeating.  
  As the RCAP has assessed, the EU has incorporated the Basel-III rules into the CRD-
IV. However, the process of implementing the CRD-IV requires adoption by many parties, such 
as the EBA and the member states64. Therefore, the actual implementation of Basel-III in 
member states’ jurisdiction will take much longer than the EU’s incorporation of Basel 
regulation into the CRD-IV.  
 
                                                          
58 Bank of International Settlements. Basel III: international regulatory framework for banks. Retrieved from: 
Retrieved from https://www.bis.org/bcbs/events/rtf04gordy_howells.pdf 
59 ECB (2016). Basel III and recourse to Eurosystem monetary policy operations. Occasional paper series no. 
171. 12-15 
60 Ibid.  p. 15-22.    
61 Ibid. p. 22-24.   
62 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2016). Eleventh progress report on the adoption of the Basel 
regulatory framework. 23  
63 Ibid. p. 23 
64 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. (2014). Regulatory Consistency Assessment Programme (RCAP) 
Assessment of Basel III regulations – European Union. 
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5. Analysis  
5.1. BASEL-III REGULATORY FRAMEWORK COMPARED TO BASEL-II 
In 2010 the ECB pointed out that the financial crisis had “… spurred thinking on banks’ risk 
management practices, on the incentives for excessive risk-taking, and on the reasons for the 
failure of regulation and supervision of the financial sector”65.  Basel-III is a direct result of 
the market failures and regulatory failures revealed by the financial crisis66 and will thus be a 
more fundamental reform plan than its predecessor.   
 The Basel-III objective is to improve the banks’ ability to absorb economic shocks, so 
that the spill-over effect from the banking sector to the real economy is substantially reduced67. 
BCBS plans to strengthen the regulatory capital framework severely68 and to raise the quality 
and quantity of the regulatory base.   
 Basel-III introduces three liquidity ratios69, which are the main improvements compared 
to Basel-II:   
- Liquidity coverage ratio (LCR): promotes strong resilience to a short period of 
economic distress. The LCR obliges banks to hold a certain amount of HQLA, which 
can be converted into cash very easily and should provide for all regular services and 
cash outflows for a full period of 30 days70. Assets will qualify as HQLA when they can 
be immediately converted into cash and can be used for central banks’ operations71. The 
ratio is calculated by:  
𝐻𝑄𝐿𝐴
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑓𝑜𝑟 30 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
 = LCR > 100%. This restricts 
banks from taking more risk and reduces banks’ lending.  
- Net stable funding ratio (NSFR): requires banks to have a stable funding profile of their 
assets. This will reduce banks’ risk of failure because of inconsistencies in a bank’s 
                                                          
65 Smagi, L, B. (2011, April 2nd). Basel III and the real economy. European Central Bank.   
66 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2011). Basel III: a global regulatory framework for more resilient 
banks and banking systems. 2-5. 
67 Ibid. p. 1-7 
68 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2011). Basel III: a global regulatory framework for more resilient 
banks and banking systems. 2-5. 
69 ECB (2016). Basel III and recourse to Eurosystem monetary policy operations. Occasional paper series no. 
171.   
70 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. (2011). Basel III: a global regulatory framework for more resilient 
banks and banking systems. 9-10.  
71 Ibid. p. 9-10.  
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sources of funding72. The main goal is to keep the cash inflow stable and resilient to 
economic distress. NSFR= 
𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
 ≥ 100%.73  
- Leverage ratio (LR): this ratio calculates how much of a bank’s capital is funded by 
debt and is a supplement to the risk-based capital requirements 74 . Just before the 
financial crisis, most banks had an excessive LR, therefore capital requirements and LR 
requirements are strengthened in Basel-III.  
 
5.2 BASEL-III IN THE EU 
5.2.1 Implementation process of Basel within the Euro-area 
To understand the lessons learnt, the formal implementation process needs to be explained.   
 The BCBS is an institution existing of central banks and banking supervisory 
institutions which do not have legally binding jurisdiction75. Therefore, the BCBS is not a 
formal supranational authority and does not have the power to force implementation. The 
member states merely commit to the agreement of implementing the proposed amendments76.  
  The implementation process is as follows: the Basel agreements are firstly endorsed 
by the G20. The EU picks key parameters which they ‘download’ into the CRD-IV and adds 
elements, such as corporate government agreements, and expands the regulatory scope to 
include non-internationally active banks77.   
  Only central banks and banks’ supervisory institutions can hold a seat as member 
state, therefore important banking regulators such as the EBA, the EC and the IMF only hold 
an observer status78. This is because no member may be influenced by any EU institution, in 
order to preserve independence. Additionally, decision making follows consensus. Because 
the accords are not legally binding, member states are pushed to consensus on the accord, 
otherwise the non-agreeing parties will simply not implement the accords79.  
                                                          
72 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. (2011). Basel III: a global regulatory framework for more resilient 
banks and banking systems. 9-10. 
73 Ibid.  p. 9-10.  
74 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2016). Eleventh progress report on the adoption of the Basel 
regulatory framework. 23 
75 European Parliament (2016). The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: a defacto standard setting in 
banking legislation. 1.  
76 Ibid. p. 1-2.  
77 Ibid. p. 3-4.  
78 Ibid. p. 4-5.  
79 European Parliament (2016). The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: a defacto standard setting in 
banking legislation. 3-4. 
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  The ECB and the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)80 hold a seat, representing the 
EU at a supranational level. They represent the common will of the Euro-area. However, nine 
states within the Euro-area are represented individually by their National Central Banks 
(NCB) as well. Therefore, these nine EU states are represented twice: by the ECB/SSM and 
their own NCB. There is no formal EU mandate for the BCBS negotiations81. This means that 
the ECB/SSM are not obliged to represent statements the EU institutions hand to them, 
because they operate separately82. However, the EP and the EC will eventually hold the power 
to implement the Basel accords in the EU.  
  Decisions are made with absolute consensus. The accords are then sent to the EC 
which will incorporate the regulation in the CRD-IV. This starts the ordinary legislative 
procedure.  
  BCBS members should keep a close connection with its legislators; thus the ECB & 
SSM should keep a close relationship with the EC & EP. The positions that the ECB/SSM 
hold in BCBS meetings are drawn up by ECB staff in working groups and senior ECB 
officials83. There is no official requirement for the ECB/SSM to report back or ask advice, but 
there are regular dialogues between the EP, ECB and EC. Also, an institutionalised “monetary 
dialogue” between the president of the ECB and the EP is established84. For example, the 
secretary general had a public meeting with the EP, which was filmed and published online85. 
To analyse the European stance on Basel-III, the most important actors are the ECB, SSM, 
EC, EP and the ECON committee within the EP. The regular internal workings of the EU and 
ECB are briefly explained in the source below86.  
                                                          
80 Retrieved from bankingsupervision.europa.eu: “The SSM refers to the system of banking supervision in 
Europe. It comprises the ECB and the national supervisory authorities of the participating countries.”  
81 European Parliament (2017). Upgrading the Basel standards: from Basel III to Basel IV?  5-6.  
82 Ibid. p. 5-6.  
83 Ibid. p. 7-8.  
84 Ibid.  p. 7-8 
85 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20161005IPR45669/committee-on-economic-and-
monetary-affairs-meeting-12102016-(pm)  
86 Retrived from: https://www.euractiv.com/section/euro-finance/opinion/decision-making-and-disarray-in-the-
eu/  
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5.2.2 Current status Basel-III: the European stance on Basel-III 
This section will explain the European stance on Basel-III, to see if lessons are incorporated.  
 The EC has expressed stark criticism on the proposed capital floors87. Having learned 
from the failure of the IRB, Basel-III is proposing a standard capital floor for how much banks’ 
capital ratio may deviate from the standard capital requirement88. A level-playing field will be 
ensured, if capital flows across the banking system do not fall beneath a certain level89. The EC 
does not agree with the new capital floors and plans on not implementing this pivotal part of 
Basel-III90. The main reason for criticism on the capital floors is that mostly solvable and low-
risk northern-European banks will be hit, whilst they are stable banks.   
  The ECON committee of the EP has adopted a resolution on the finalization of Basel-
III, in which they underlined the importance of the Basel accords, but stress that the proposed 
                                                          
87 European Parliament (2017). Upgrading the Basel standards: from Basel III to Basel IV?  5-6.   
88 De Horde, C. (2017, January 3rd). ‘Overleg bankenregels muurvast’. Financieel Dagblad.  
89 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. (2015). Consultative document: capital floors: the design of a 
framework based on standardised approaches. Retrieved from http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d306.pdf 
90 De Horde, C. (2017, January 3rd). ‘Overleg bankenregels muurvast’. Financieel Dagblad.  
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global standards may have a negative impact on the global level-playing field91. They believe 
the differences between jurisdictions and banking-models should not be emphasized and that 
capital floors should not be significantly increased. They believe that excessive variances in 
capital ratios should not be repeated,92 but they believe that the proposed amendments still do 
not fully pledge for a level-playing field and may even penalise the EU banking model93. They 
also believe that the proposed amendments are not aligned with the principle of proportionality. 
  Additionally, the ECON committee is worried that Basel-III would negatively affect 
European SMEs, which are one of the most important factors of the European economy. They 
also call on the EC, ECB, EBA and BCBS to increase their communication. A strong, common 
European position should be presented at BCBS meetings94.    
  Furthermore, the EC has made some changes to the Basel-III accord. It has implemented 
that Basel-III applies to all EU-banks, not just the internationally-active banks95. The EC has 
taken the power to extend the phasing-in period. It proposed a concession on the LR for certain 
banks and has expressed that the capital floors will not be implemented as they are proposed 
momentarily.   
  As it seems, most institutions agree that the proposed capital floors should not be 
implemented, that SMEs are negatively affected by Basel-III and that communication between 
the relevant institutions should be increased.  
5.2.3 Interplay EU and US 
The American influence on the EU even reaches as far as the proposed ECON amendment of 
the EP96 . Therefore, it is important to analyse the interplay between the EU and the US 
regarding the Basel accords, in assessing what lessons can be learned for implementing Basel-
III.   
 Within these BCBS meetings, power configuration has become an EU-US bipolarity. 
                                                          
91 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20161005IPR45669/committee-on-economic-and-
monetary-affairs-meeting-12102016-(pm) 
92 ECON committee of the European Parliament (2011). Motion for a resolution on the finalisation of Basel-III. 
Paper presented at the plenary sitting of the European Parliament, Brussels.  
93 Motion for a resolution by the ECON committee of the European Parliament (2011): “Underlines that a second 
and equally important principle to be respected by the revision is to promote the level playing field at the global 
level by mitigating – rather than exacerbating – the differences between jurisdictions and banking models, and 
by not unduly penalising the EU banking model” 
94 ECON committee of the European Parliament (2011). Motion for a resolution on the finalisation of Basel-III. 
Paper presented at the plenary sitting of the European Parliament, Brussels. 
95ibid.  
96 Motion for a resolution by the ECON committee of the European Parliament (2011): “whereas the majority of 
US financial institutions use the standardised approach for credit risk evaluations, while in the EU many large 
and medium banks rely on internal models” 
25 
Leiden university | International Relations and Organisations | Bachelor Thesis | Cassie Tingen | 
Whether the US or EU dominates depends on their domestic regulatory capacity 97 . A 
jurisdiction has a weak regulatory capacity if domestic politics are not able to forge a strong 
common position. Depending on their regulatory capacity, the domination of BCBS meetings 
juggles between the EU and the US. Momentarily, the EU and the US are not aligned on Basel-
III. The US, which was hard hit by the financial crisis, wants higher capital requirements98. EU, 
however, is opposed to high leverage ratios. Yet, the EU representatives do not forge a strong 
common position against the US99. Therefore, the EU is not able to ‘upload’ its own ideas into 
Basel legislation successfully.   
  Recently, American senator McHenry published a letter concerning the possible 
American resistance to complete implementation of Basel-III100. The main reason was that 
Trump’s ‘America first’ should be upheld, instead of negotiating within the international BCBS. 
This position is remarkable for America, as the US have been one of the leaders in forming 
Basel-III and have always advocated stricter capital requirement. This shows the unpredictable 
nature of the US at the moment. EU implementation has been slowed down, as a consequence 
of the American resistance, showing how much the EU depends on the US to complete its own 
implementation.           
 A neoliberal institutionalist view would argue that these two world powers struggle for 
domination within the BCBS. Although they independently strive for their own interest, they 
both believe international cooperation is beneficial in the long run. They therefore place great 
faith in the BCBS and use the BCBS to further their own interests.101  
5.3 FACTORS OF INFLUENCE ON THE EUROPEAN STANCE ON BASEL-
III 
To correctly analyse what lessons the EU can take from Basel-II in the implementation of Basel-
III, the factors shaping the European stance on Basel-III should be clear.   
 Firstly, the influence of American decision-making on Basel. For example, the claim of 
senator McHenry to stop further implementation of Basel-III in the USA, made implementation 
                                                          
97 Quaglia, L. (2014). The European Union, the USA and International Standard Setting by Regulatory Fora in 
Finance, New Political Economy. 429-430. 
98 Ibid. p. 429-430.  
99  Ibid. p. 431-432.  
100 De Boer, M. (2017, april 23rd). ‘Wereld bang om Amerikaanse alleingang financiële regulering’. Financieel 
Dagblad.  
101 Whyte, A. (2012). Neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism: born of the same approach? [Blog post]. 
Retrieved from http://www.e-ir.info/2012/06/11/neorealism-and-neoliberal-institutionalism-born-of-the-same-
approach/ 
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of Basel-III in the EU slow down as well102. The EU alone does not have the international 
preponderance to push its own ideas through within the BCBS: it needs the US. The 
unpredictable political course of Trump is also causing implementation of Basel-III in the EU 
to be slowed down103. This is a precautionary measure, as American political actions are 
unpredictable at the moment104.  
  Secondly, other BCBS member states influence the European stance as well. Creating a 
level-playing field between the BCBS member states is a priority. If every member state would 
individually decide on when and how to implement Basel-III, investors would start using 
regulatory arbitrage105. Member states would start a ‘race to the bottom’, meaning they each 
would keep implementation of Basel-III as marginal as possible, to make their jurisdiction 
attractive to investors106.    
 Thirdly, the EU participates in many different international financial regulatory fora. 
They all issue soft law that the EU must implement in their binding regulation107. The EP and 
EC need to decide on which regulatory reform to prioritize. The EU tries to adapt all these 
international banking regulations into the CDR IV.  
  Fourthly, the stances of EU member states independently influence the European stance 
on Basel-III. Sometimes EU-members with independent seats in the BCBS cooperate and 
exchange views to influence the ECB’s in BCBS meetings108. In addition, EU institutions 
internally also sometimes have conflicting interests. A consensus between EU institutions must 
be reached in these situations too109.  
  Finally, the financial crisis shapes the EU’s opinion of Basel-III. In the official Basel-
III proposal the financial crisis is mentioned as one of the reasons for the creation of Basel-
III110.  
  How the EU views Basel-III has an impact on what lessons the EU has learned from the 
past. For example, the EU may have learned that slow implementation of Basel-II was one of 
                                                          
102 Couwenbergh, P. (2017, febuary 3rd). ‘Frankrijk zal nieuwe Basel-akkoord ten grave dragen’. Financieel 
Dagblad.  
103 Ibid. 
104 Interview policy official European Parliament.  
105 De Boer, M. (2017, april 23rd). ‘Wereld bang om Amerikaanse alleingang financiële regulering’. Financieel 
Dagblad. 
106 Ibid.  
107 ECON committee of the European Parliament (2015). The EU’s role in international economic for a. Paper 5: 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 16-17.  
108 ibid. p. 16-18.    
109Ibid. p. 16-18.    
110 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2011). Basel III: a global regulatory framework for more resilient 
banks and banking systems. 2-5. 
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the causes of the financial crisis, but if America is slowly implementing Basel-III, the EU will 
slow down its implementation of Basel-III as well. Lessons may be learnt, but many factors still 
shape how the EU chooses to react to these lessons.  
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  6. Discussion: lessons learnt 
Now that the deficiencies of Basel-II, the implementation of Basel-III and the factors shaping 
EU’s decisions around Basel-III are assessed, lessons can be learnt for the implementation of 
Basel-III.   
  Firstly, some lessons regarding the technical aspect of Basel-II can be learnt. Some 
regulatory aspects of Basel-II turned out to have negatively affected the economy during the 
crisis. Especially procyclicality has turned out to have worsened the economic crisis. As 
discussed in chapter 4.2, the EU had already voiced its concern about the procyclical aspects of 
Basel-II. Nevertheless, the BCBS continued a procyclical course. Having learnt from its 
mistakes, Basel-III has incorporated countercyclical measures to ensure that its capital 
requirements flow together with its macro-financial environment, instead of worsening the 
economic situation in times of economic crisis111.  
  A second technical lesson that was learnt concerns the risk assessment tools and capital 
adequacy requirements. As discussed in chapter 4.2, Basel-II’s risk assessment measurements 
relied heavily on self-regulation and market discipline112. Operational risk and IRB made it 
possible for banks to assess their own risk. The risk assessment of ‘independent’ rating agencies 
were also used, which turned out to be mostly faulty. Additionally, just one capital adequacy 
ratio (CAP) was incorporated in Basel-II 113 . All this together made for an unstable and 
unbalanced risk assessment. In Basel-III, however, the risk assessment measures have been 
greatly improved and expanded on. Instead of one fairly simplistic CAP, Basel-III has three 
CAPs to cover different aspects of liquidity risk assessment. Also, the operational risk method 
has been replaced by a more sophisticated and improved standardised measurement approach. 
The BCBS declared that the operational risk measurement was faulty, because the ratio 
remained stable while operational risk visibly increased114. Therefore, the BCBS decided to 
withdraw the operational risk ratio from Basel-III.  
  Some regulatory lessons can be taken from Basel-II as well. Firstly, there is room for 
improvement in the coordination between the EU Member states’ representatives and the EU-
                                                          
111 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2011). Basel III: a global regulatory framework for more resilient 
banks and banking systems. 2-5.  
112 European Parliament (2017). Upgrading the Basel standards: from Basel III to Basel IV?  5-6.   
113 Awad, A. (2013). Why Basel-III? Lessons learnt from the financial crisis.  Paper presented at Banking 
Control Commission Lebanon, Beirut, Lebanon.  
114 European Parliament (2017). Upgrading the Basel standards: from Basel III to Basel IV?  5-6.   
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institutions’ representatives within the BCBS. As discussed in chapter 4.3.2, the ECB and SSM 
have to represent the ‘EU interest’, which might conflict with the Member States’ interest115. 
In Basel-II negotiations, the UK sided with the US against the EU. This resulted in a non-
cohesive position for the EU, because the UK did not side alongside the EU. Therefore, the EU 
was not able to negotiate firmly and upload its ideas. If the EU is not cohesive in BCBS 
meetings, it will be overruled by world powers such as the US and Japan. The EU should learn 
from the negotiation process of Basel-II and formulate a cohesive, strong and concrete position 
within the BCBS.   
  Furthermore, there is room for improvement in the communication between the ECB 
and SSM on the one side, and EC and EP on the other side. As the ECB/SSM represent the 
EU’s interest, but they are not legislators. It takes an extremely long time before the CRD-IV 
is implemented in all member states. The slow implementation of Basel-II was one of the 
reasons that the financial crisis escalated; implementation was incomplete, thus banks were not 
resilient to financial turmoil. The representation and implementation process has remained the 
same, thus implementation of Basel-III will remain slow. The EU and BCBS should take 
lessons from Basel-II and strive for quicker implementation.   
  The most important lesson from Basel-II revolves around the creation of a level-
playing field for the member states. As discussed in chapter 4.3.1, Basel is soft law and is 
therefore not legally binding. Although member states agree on implementing the accords as 
prescribed, they are able to partially implement the proposed regulation or amend it to fit their 
own financial priorities116. Because Basel-III is also a soft law, regulatory arbitrage is still 
possible. Inconsistency of implementation will result from this. This will eventually lead to 
regulatory competitiveness among member states. States that only implement the Basel 
standards partially, will be more attractive to banks that are negatively affected by the capital 
requirements. Creating a level-playing field will fail if regulatory arbitrage is possible. During 
Basel-II regulatory arbitrage was still possible, so the EU and BCBS should take lessons from 
Basel-II and critically asses the freedom member states enjoy in implementing the accords.   
 Lastly, the EU should take lessons from Basel-II regarding the dependence on the US. 
As discussed above, EU’s implementation has been dependent on US implementation. This 
slowed down the implementation process of Basel-II and is currently slowing down the 
implementation of Basel-III. As the Trump administration has stated they may even want to 
                                                          
115 ECON committee of the European Parliament (2015). The EU’s role in international economic for a. Paper 5: 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 16-17. 
116 Ibid.  
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halt implementation of Basel-III, the EU should become less reliant on American decision-
making.  
  Thus, Basel-III should learn that EU representation should be improved, implementation 
should be sped up, a level-playing field should be reached and dependence on the US should 
be decreased.  
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7. Conclusion 
  
"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” 
– George Santayana  
As George Santayana pointed out, history is meant to be learned from and mistakes are not 
meant to be repeated. This thesis has analysed whether the EU and the BCBS have repeated 
their mistakes or have taken the time to reflect and make sure not to repeat them. In international 
relations Basel-II and the financial crisis are analysed and assessed, but the conclusions from 
those assessments have not been applied on modern day implementation yet. This thesis looked 
at the deficiencies and mistakes from the past and applied them to the present implementation 
phase to assess whether the EU has taken Santayana’s advice.      
  This thesis has discovered that the EU and the BCBS have partially repeated their 
mistakes, but that they have learnt from the past as well. The financial crisis was one of the 
reasons for setting up Basel-III, however, it sometimes seems like the causes and implications 
of Basel-II and the financial crisis have been forgotten. Deficiencies are repeated and 
communication flows are still slow and inefficient. However, in some technical aspects, the EU 
has learnt from Basel-II.   
  Firstly, as we have read in chapter 5.2.1, Basel-III incorporated a pro-cyclical buffer to 
ensure pro-cyclicality would not be as strong as it was in Basel-II. Pro-cyclicality turned out to 
be one of the major mistakes of Basel-II, and the BCBS therefore changed course and learnt 
from its mistakes. The same applies for the risk-assessment tools. It became clear that risk-
assessment in Basel-II was flawed, therefore the risk-assessment of Basel-III was greatly 
expanded on. Thus, in most technical aspects, the BCBS and the EU have learnt from Basel-II, 
to ensure banks’ resilience in the face of a new financial crisis.   
  However, in the process of implementation the same mistakes are bound to be repeated.  
If the technical aspects of Basel-III are better than Basel-II, it does not mean that a financial 
crisis can be evaded. There are other variables that influence whether Basel-III will increase 
resilience. Firstly, the process of implementation within its member states. Lessons should have 
been learnt from the slow and inefficient implementation of Basel-II, but the same mistakes are 
about to be repeated. A level-playing field between the BCBS member states will still not be 
reached. Although implementation is being monitored by the RCAP, there are no judicial 
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consequences if member states implement Basel-III partially or at their own pace. The EC, for 
example, has the power to extend Basel-III implementation without any judicial consequence. 
Regulatory arbitrage will still be possible, therefore a level-playing field cannot be achieved. 
 A second lesson that should be learnt from past implementation is that the EU 
representation within the BCBS is not as strong as it could be. In order for the EU to upload 
regulation which is profitable for themselves, their representation within the BCBS should be 
improved. The double-representation of nine EU member states causes division and confusion 
on the European position. The EU therefore cannot compete against world-powers such as 
Japan and the US. The EU should have taken lessons from Basel-II and tried to improve on 
their cohesive representation during the Basel-III negotiations.   
  Thirdly, the EU remains very dependent on the US. In Basel-II this resulted in slow 
implementation and the US dominating Basel-II negotiations. In the implementation process 
currently, the same is happening. The US are very unpredictable and have threatened to stop 
Basel-III implementation all together. The EU remains dependent on the US to further their 
implementation; therefore implementation of Basel-III comes is jeopardized if the EU continues 
this dependent course. It is advisable for the EU to increase its cohesiveness within the BCBS 
and reduce dependence on the US. The Trump administration remains very unpredictable at 
present and the EU should try to avoid being dependent on an unpredictable variable. The only 
way of achieving this, however, is to increase cohesiveness within the EU and form a joint 
position. This remains a very difficult process as it requires further European integration.  
  Alongside the EU having to increase its cohesiveness, the problem for the BCBS still 
remains that their mandate is non-binding. In order to fully increase efficiency of Basel-III and 
achieve the goals set out for it, the mandate of the BCBS should be stronger. However, the 
BCBS want to stay independent and are proud of their consensus-based decision-making 
framework. Therefore, the Basel accords are stranded between trying to remain independent 
and non-binding and trying to efficiently change the banking system so that it becomes resilient 
to another financial crisis. It is therefore very interesting to research how this will play out for 
Basel-III. It may be that a level-playing field will never be reached and the EU remains largely 
dependent on the US. It may be that the US changes course and stops Basel-III, resulting in a 
domino-effect with other member states discharging Basel-III as well. Or, it may be that the 
improvements of Basel-III are reach far enough and the resilience of the banking sector will 
greatly improve over the next few years.  
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